Christian Baker
https://christianjbaker.com
cbaker8128@gmail.com
(801)791-0411

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Contact Information
9922 E 200 S
Huntsville, UT 84317

Personal Information: U.S. citizen

Education

Ph.D., Economics, The University of Chicago, 2021

B.S., Mathematics, Brigham Young University, 2014

References:

Benjamin Brooks (Chair)	Emir Kamenica
University of Chicago	Univ. of Chicago Booth School of Business
babrooks@uchicago.edu	emir.kamenica@chicagobooth.edu
(773) 702-4862	(773)834-8690

Doron Ravid
University of Chicago
dravid@uchicago.edu
(773)795-1530

Research Fields:

Microeconomic Theory, Information Economics

Teaching Experience:

Autumn, 2019	Mathematical Methods in Economics (Ph.D.), University of Chicago, Instructor
Spring, 2018	Price Theory III (Ph.D.), University of Chicago, Teaching Assistant for Philip Reny
Winter, 2018	Intermediate Microeconomics (Undergraduate), University of Chicago, Instructor
Autumn, 2017	Game Theory (Undergraduate), University of Chicago, Teaching Assistant for Ryan Fang
Autumn, 2017	Introduction to Microeconomics (Undergraduate), University of Chicago, Teaching Assistant for Allen Sanderson
Summer, 2017	Introduction to Macroeconomics (Undergraduate), University of Chicago, Teaching Assistant for Allen Sanderson
Spring, 2017	Game Theory (Undergraduate), University of Chicago, Teaching Assistant for Roger Myerson

Research Experience and Other Employment:
  2018   University of Chicago, Research Assistant for Doron Ravid
  2018   University of Chicago, Research Assistant for Ben Brooks

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships:
  2014-2020   Division of Social Sciences Fellowship, University of Chicago

Computer Skills:
      Python, C++, Stata, R

Language Skills:
      English (Native), Mandarin Chinese (Fluent)

Research Papers:
Economies and Diseconomies of Scale in the Cost of Information
(Revise and Resubmit at Theoretical Economics)
I present a theory of information acquisition that captures the notion of economies and diseconomies of scale. I formulate a cost function that generalizes the constant marginal cost function in Pomatto et al. (2023). I demonstrate how to apply this cost function to decision problems. While economies of scale will push a decision maker toward a balanced learning strategy, diseconomies of scale will encourage a decision maker to focus her attention on a limited number of states.

Working Papers:
Reputation in Markets for Information
I present a model of information markets, such as news media, that investigates the impact of reputation on information quality. Firms derive a payoff based on whether a consumer pays attention, and consumers tune in only to information sources they deem reputable. The reputation of a firm is determined by how accurate the consumer believes the firm's report to be, and the beliefs of the consumer are in turn influenced by the aggregate reporting from the firms. Equilibria emerge in which all suppliers provide low-quality information, or all suppliers provide high-quality information.

Signaling via Research
Firms hire researchers of unknown types in a competitive job market. Researchers can signal their type via the choice of a costly experiment. Unlike standard signaling scenarios, researchers face a problem of information design rather than optimal effort. While the realized information of the experiment is observable, the experimental process is not. I show that this can limit the informativeness of equilibrium research: if the equilibrium research experiments are asymmetric, then there always exists an equilibrium with observable experiments that is more informative.

Other Papers:
Cheap Talk with Costly Outside Information
I study a model of cheap talk in which the receiver, after having received a message from the sender, may endogenously acquire additional information by paying an entropy cost. Using tools from the Bayesian persuasion and rational inattention literature, I examine the structure of the receiver's learning strategy and how this influences the ability of the sender to engage in persuasive communication.